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Abstract
Nested code pairs play a crucial role in the construction of ramp secret sharing
schemes [15] and in the CSS construction of quantum codes [14]. The important
parameters are (1) the codimension, (2) the relative minimum distance of the
codes, and (3) the relative minimum distance of the dual set of codes. Given
values for two of them, one aims at finding a set of nested codes having para-
meters with these values and with the remaining parameter being as large as
possible. In this work we study nested codes from the Hermitian curve. For not
too small codimension, we present improved constructions and provide closed
formula estimates on their performance. For small codimension we show how
to choose pairs of one-point algebraic geometric codes in such a way that one
of the relative minimum distances is larger than the corresponding non-relative
minimum distance.
Keywords: Algebraic geometric code, Asymmetric quantum code, Hermitian
curve, ramp secret sharing, relative minimum distance
2000 MSC: 94B27, 94A62, 81Q99
1 Introduction
In this paper we study improved constructions of nested code pairs from
the Hermitian curve. Here the phrase ‘improved construction’ refers to
optimizing those parameters important for the corresponding linear ramp
secret sharing schemes as well as stabilizer asymmetric quantum codes. Our
work is a natural continuation of [7], where improved constructions of nested
code pairs were defined from Cartesian product point sets. The analysis in
the present paper includes a closed formula estimate on the dimension of
order bound improved Hermitian codes, which is of interest in its own right,
i.e. also without the above mentioned applications.
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method to en-
code a secret message in F`q into n shares from Fq. These shares are then
distributed among a group of n parties and only specified subgroups are able
to reconstruct the secret. A secret sharing scheme is characterized by its
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privacy number t and its reconstruction number r. The first is defined as the
largest number such that no subgroup of this size can obtain any information
on the secret. The second is defined to be the smallest number such that
any subgroup of this size can reconstruct the entire secret. A linear ramp
secret sharing scheme can be understood as the following coset construction.
Consider linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ Fnq . Let {~b1, . . . ,~bk2} be a basis for C2
and extend it to a basis {~b1, . . . ,~bk2 ,~bk2+1, . . . ,~bk2+`} for C1. Here, of course,
` is the codimension of C1 and C2. Choose elements a1, . . . , ak2 uniformly
and independent at random and encode the secret ~s = (s1, . . . , s`) as the
codeword ~c = (c1, . . . , cn) = a1~b1 + · · ·+ak2~bk2 +s1~bk2+1 + · · ·+s`~bk2+`. Then
use c1, . . . , cn as the shares. The crucial parameters for the construction
are the codimension of the pair of nested codes and their relative minimum
distances d(C1, C2) and d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ). Recall that these are defined as
d(C1, C2) = min{wH(~c) | ~c ∈ C1\C2}
and similar for the dual codes. The following well-known theorem (see
for instance [15]) shows how to determine the privacy number and the
reconstruction number.
Theorem 1. Given Fq-linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 of length n and codimension
`, the corresponding ramp secret sharing scheme encodes secrets ~s ∈ F`q into
a set of n shares from Fq. The privacy number equals t = d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ) − 1,
and the reconstruction number is r = n− d(C1, C2) + 1.
A linear q-ary asymmetric quantum error-correcting code is a qk dimen-
sional subspace of the Hilbert space Cqn where error bases are defined by
unitary operators Z and X, the first representing phase-shift errors, and the
second representing bit-flip errors [2, 21, 14]. In [13] it was identified that in
some realistic models phase-shift errors occur more frequently than bit-flip
errors, and the asymmetric codes were therefore introduced [13, 19, 5, 16, 25]
to balance the error correcting ability accordingly. For such codes we write
the set of parameters as [[n, k, dz/dx]]q where dz is the minimum distance
related to phase-shift errors and dx is the minimum distance related to
bit-flip errors. The CSS construction transforms a pair of nested classical
linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ Fnq into an asymmetric quantum code. From [19]
we have
Theorem 2. Consider linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ Fnq . Then the corresponding
asymmetric quantum code defined using the CSS construction has parameters
[[n, ` = dimC1 − dimC2, dz/dx]]q
where dz = d(C1, C2) and dx = d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ).
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Quantum codes with d(C1, C2) > d(C1) or d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ) > d(C⊥2 ) are called
impure, and they are desirable due to the fact that one can take advantage of
this property in connection with the error-correction. More precisely, one can
tolerate b(d(C1, C2)− 1)/2c phase-shift errors and b(d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 )− 1)/2c bit-
flip errors, respectively, but in the decoding algorithms it is only necessary
to correct up to b(d(C1) − 1)/2c and b(d(C⊥2 ) − 1)/2c errors, respectively.
Despite this observation, only few impure codes have been presented in the
literature.
With the above two applications in mind, the challenge is to find nested
codes C2 ⊂ C1 such that two of the parameters `, d(C1, C2), d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 )
attain given prescribed values, and the remaining parameter is as large
as possible. In this paper we analyse two good constructions from the
Hermitian function field. In the first we consider code pairs such that C1 is
an order bound improved primary code [1, 10] and such that C2 is the dual
of an order bound improved dual code [12]. Considering in this case the
minimum distances rather than the relative distances is no restriction due
to the optimized choice of codes – the minimum distances d(C1) and d(C⊥2 )
being so good that there is essentially no room for d(C1, C2) > d(C1) or
d(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 ) > d(C
⊥
2 ) to hold. For this construction to work, the codimension
cannot be very small. For small codimension when d(C1) and d(C⊥2 ) are far
from each other we then show how to choose ordinary one-point algebraic
geometric codes such that one of the relative distances becomes larger
than the corresponding ordinary minimum distance. In particular, this
construction leads to impure asymmetric quantum codes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we collect material
from the literature on how to determine parameters of primary and dual
codes coming from the Hermitian curve, and we introduce the order bound
improved codes1. In Section 3 we establish closed formula lower bounds on
the dimension of order bound improved Hermitian codes of any designed
minimum distance. We then continue in Section 4 by determining the
pairs (δ1, δ2) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n} for which the order bound improved
primary code C1 of designed distance δ1 contains C2, the dual of an order
bound improved dual code of designed distance δ2. This and the information
from Section 3 is then translated into information on improved nested code
pairs of not too small codimension in Section 5. Next, in Section 6 we
determine parameters of nested one-point algebraic geometric code pairs of
small codimension for which one of the relative distances is larger than the
1This section also contains a collective treatment of the order bounds for general
primary as well as dual (improved) one-point algebraic geometric codes which may not
be easy to find in the literature.
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non-relative. Finally, in Section 7 samples of the given constructions are
compared with known asymmetric quantum codes, with existence bounds
on asymmetric quantum codes, and with non-existence bounds on linear
ramp secret sharing schemes. Section 8 is the conclusion.
2 Hermitian codes and their parameters
Given an algebraic function field over a finite field, let = P1, . . . , Pn, Q be
rational places. By H(Q) we denote the Weierstrass semigroup of Q, and
we write
H∗(Q) = {λ ∈ H(Q) | CL(D,λQ) 6= CL(D, (λ− 1)Q)}
where D = P1 + · · ·+Pn. Recall that the dual code of CL(D,λQ) is written
CΩ(D,λQ). The order bound [12, 4] then tells us that if
~c ∈ CΩ(D, (λ− 1)Q) \CΩ(D,λQ)
(which can only happen if λ ∈ H∗(Q)), then the Hamming weight of ~c
satisfies
wH(~c) ≥ µ(λ) (1)
where
µ(λ) = #{η ∈ H(Q) | λ− η ∈ H(Q)}.
The similar bound for the primary case [8, 1, 10] tells us that if
~c ∈ CL(D,λQ) \CL(D, (λ− 1)Q), S
then
wH(~c) ≥ σ(λ) (2)
where
σ(λ) = #{η ∈ H∗(Q) | η − λ ∈ H(Q)}.
Besides implying that
d(CL(D,λQ)) ≥ min{σ(γ) | 0 ≤ γ ≤ λ, γ ∈ H∗(Q)}
d(CΩ(D,λQ)) ≥ min{µ(γ) | λ < γ, γ ∈ H∗(Q)}, (3)
which are both as strong as the Goppa bound, it tells us that for , λ ∈ H∗(Q)
with  < λ it holds that
d(CL(D,λQ), CL(D, Q)) ≥ min{σ(γ) |  < γ ≤ λ, γ ∈ H∗(Q)}, (4)
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and similarly
d(CΩ(D, Q), CΩ(D,λQ)) ≥ min{µ(γ) |  < γ ≤ λ, γ ∈ H∗(Q)}. (5)
Furthermore, for i ∈ H∗(Q) let fi ∈ L(iQ)\L((i − 1)Q). Then we obtain
the improved primary code
E˜(δ) = Span{(fi(P1), . . . , fi(Pn)) | σ(i) ≥ δ},
which clearly has minimum distance at least δ and highest possible dimension
for a primary code with that designed distance. Similarly, the improved
dual code
C˜(δ) =
(
Span{(fi(P1), . . . , fi(Pn)) | µ(i) < δ}
)⊥
has minimum distance at least δ and again the highest possible dimension
for a dual code with that designed distance.
Turning to the Hermitian curve xq+1 − yq − y over Fq2 where q is a
prime power, it is well-known that the corresponding function field has
exactly q3 + 1 rational places P1, . . . , Pq3 , Q. Choosing n = q3 one obtains
H(Q) = 〈q, q + 1〉 and
H∗(Q) = {iq + j(q + 1) | 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1}. (6)
In [23] it was shown that
CL(D,λQ) = CΩ(D, (q3 + q2 − q − 2− λ)Q) (7)
for any λ ∈ H∗(Q), and the minimum distance was established for di-
mensions up to a certain value. The minimum distance for the remaining
dimensions was then settled in [26]. In the present paper we shall need
improved code constructions, and we will in some cases also be occupied
with the relative distances rather than minimum distances. To this end we
recall material from [8] on the functions µ and σ – stated there in the more
general case of norm-trace curves, but adapted here to the Hermitian case.
Proposition 3. Consider the Hermitian curve. For iq + j(q + 1) ∈ H∗(Q)
we have
σ(iq + j(q + 1)) =
{
q3 − iq − j(q + 1) if 0 ≤ i < q2 − q
(q2 − i)(q − j) if q2 − q ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1, (8)
and µ
(
(q2 − 1 − i)q + (q − 1 − j)(q + 1)) = σ(iq + j(q + 1)). For each
λ ∈ H∗(Q) there exists a word ~c ∈ (CL(D,λQ)\CL(D, (λ−1)Q))∩ E˜(σ(λ))
having Hamming weight equal to σ(λ).
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Proof. Given a numerical semigroup Λ with finitely many gaps and an
element λ ∈ Λ, we know from [12, Lem. 5.15] that #(Λ\(λ+ Λ)) = λ. As
#H∗(Q) = q3 we therefore obtain σ(iq + j(q + 1)) ≥ q3 − (iq + j(q + 1)).
On the other hand, it is clear that σ(iq + j(q + 1)) ≥ (q2 − i)(q − j) by the
definition of σ. Taking the maximum between these two expressions, we
obtain the right hand side of (8). That these estimates on σ are the true
values and that the last part of the proposition holds true both follow as a
consequence of [8, Lem. 4]. The details of applying [8, Lem. 4] are left for
the reader. Finally, the relation between µ and σ is a consequence of H∗(Q)
being a box in the parameters i and j, see (6).
In Appendix A we list a series of lemmas which all follow as corollaries to
Proposition 3 and which will be needed in Sections 3 and 4.
Throughout the rest of the paper we restrict to considering codes derived
from the Hermitian curve, and we always assume the length to be n = q3.
From Proposition 3 we see that the bound (4) on the relative distance of
CL(D, Q) ⊂ CL(D,λQ) is sharp. A similar remark then holds for the
bound (5) on the dual codes due to (7). Finally, we observe from [8, Sec. 4]
that
E˜(δ) = C˜(δ) (9)
holds. Proposition 3 therefore not only gives us the true value of the
minimum distance of the improved primary codes (without loss of generality
we may assume δ = σ(λ) for some λ ∈ H∗(Q)), but also does it for the
improved dual codes.
We conclude the section with some information on the cases where the
improved primary codes coincide with one-point algebraic geometric codes.
Corollary 4. For δ > q2 − q we have E˜(δ) = CL
(
D, (q3 − δ)Q), but
CL
(
D, (q3 − (q2 − q))Q) is strictly contained in E˜(q2 − q).
This corollary implies that the dimension of E˜(δ) can be determined from
the usual one-point Hermitian codes whenever δ > q2−q. For later reference
we state these dimensions in terms of δ.
Proposition 5. Denote by g = q(q− 1)/2 the genus of Hermitian function
field. If q2 − q < δ < q3 − 2g + 2, then the dimension of E˜(δ) is given by
q3 − g + 1− δ. If q3 − 2g + 2 ≤ δ ≤ q3, we have
dim E˜(δ) =
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1)−max{a, 0}
where q3 − δ = aq + b(q + 1) for −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
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Proof. First, note that in both cases Corollary 4 implies the equality E˜(δ) =
CL(D, (q3 − δ)Q). For the first case recall from [24, Cor. II.2.3] that the
code CL(D,λG) has dimension λ+ 1− g whenever 2g − 2 < λ < n. By the
assumptions on δ, we have q3 − δ > q3 − (q3 − 2g + 2) = 2g − 2, meaning
that CL(D, (q3 − δ)Q) has dimension q3 − δ + 1− g. By the observation in
the beginning of the proof, the same holds true for E˜(δ).
To prove the second case, observe that the dimension of CL(d, (q3− δ)Q)
is exactly the number of elements λ in H∗(Q) with λ ≤ q3 − δ. By (6) such
elements have the form λ = iq + j(q + 1), but equivalently we can write
λ = i′q+ j where i′ = i+ j. By the division algorithm this representation is
unique for 0 ≤ j < q. For i′q + j to satisfy the requirements of (6), we also
require i′− j = i ≥ 0. That is, H∗(Q) contains the integers whose quotients
modulo q are at least their remainders modulo q.
Writing q3− δ = (a+ b)q+ b with 0 ≤ b < q using the division algorithm,
the number of elements inH∗(Q) less than (a+b+1)q is given by
∑a+b
s=0(s+1).
If b ≥ a+ b, which happens only if a ≤ 0, this number is also the number of
elements with value at most q3−δ. Otherwise, the count includes b−(a+b) =
a elements of H∗(Q) that are greater than q3 − δ. Hence, subtracting
max{a, 0} gives the desired count in both cases.
It remains to establish information on the dimension of E˜(δ) for δ ≤ q2 − q
since the improved codes differ from the usual Hermitian codes in this case.
This subject is treated in the next section.
3 The dimension of improved codes
As explained in the previous section, the dimension of E˜(δ) can be determ-
ined from well-known methods as long as δ > q2 − q. In this section we
present closed formula lower bounds on the dimension in the remaining
cases. We start with an important lemma.
Lemma 6. Let δ ≤ q2. The number of integer points
(x, y) ∈ {q2 − q, . . . , q2 − 1} × {0, . . . , q − 1}
with (q2 − x)(q − y) ≥ δ is at least
q2 − ⌊δ + δ ln(q2/δ)⌋ . (10)
If δ < q, then the number of integer points is at least
q2 − bδ + δ ln(δ)c , (11)
which is stronger than (10).
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Proof. The number of integer points in the given Cartesian product is at
least that of the volume of
{(x, y) ∈ [q2 − q, q2]× [0, q] | (q2 − x)(q − y) ≥ δ},
which equals ∫ q2− δ
q
q2−q
∫ q− δ
q2−x
0
dy dx
=q(q2 − δ
q
− q2 + q) +
∫ q2−q
q2− δ
q
δ
q2 − x dx
=q2 − δ − δ[ln(z)]qδ
q
= q2 − δ − δ ln(q2/δ),
where we used the substitution z = q2 − x. Since the number of integer
points is integral, we obtain the bound dq2 − δ − δ ln(q2/δ)e, which is the
same as (10).
If δ < q, then the number of integer points is at least the combined
volumes of
{(x, y) ∈ [q2 − q, q2]× [0, q] | x ≤ q2 − δ or y ≤ q − δ}
and
{(x, y) ∈ [q2 − δ, q2]× [q − δ, q] | (q2 − x)(q − y) ≥ δ}.
The first mentioned volume equals q2 − δ2. The latter volume is∫ q2−1
q2−δ
∫ q− δ
q2−x
q−δ
dy dx
=
∫ q2−1
q2−δ
(
δ − δ
q2 − x
)
dx
=δ(δ − 1)− δ[ln(z)]δ1 = δ(δ − 1)− δ ln(δ).
Adding up the two volumes, we obtain (11) by applying the ceiling function
as above.
The dimension of the improved codes of designed distance at most q2 − q is
covered by the following two propositions. Recall from (9) that the equality
C˜(δ) = E˜(δ) holds for codes defined from the Hermitian function field.
Hence, the stated formulas for primary codes also hold for the dual codes.
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Proposition 7. Given q < δ ≤ q2 − q write
q3 − δ = q3 − q2 + aq + b(q + 1)
where −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
If 0 < a, then
dim(E˜(δ)) ≥ q3 − δ − g + 1−
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1) + a+ q2 − ⌊δ + δ ln(q2/δ)⌋ .
If a ≤ 0, then
dim(E˜(δ)) ≥ q3 − δ − g + 1−
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1) + q2 − ⌊δ + δ ln(q2/δ)⌋ .
Proof. Let g = q(q − 1)/2 be the number of gaps in H(Q), i.e. the genus
of the function field. As is well-known, for 2g ≤ λ < q3 − 1 the number of
 ∈ H∗(Q) with  ≤ λ equals λ− g + 1. Therefore, by choosing λ = q3 − δ
the restriction on δ as given in the proposition implies that there are exactly
q3 − δ − g + 1 elements  ∈ H∗(Q) with  ≤ q3 − δ. These elements then
satisfy σ() ≥ δ by Lemma 25. From (8) we see that the additional elements
in H∗(Q) with σ() ≥ δ must belong to
{iq + j(q + 1) | q2 − q ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1}. (12)
Lemma 6 gives an estimate on the total number of elements  in (12) with
σ() ≥ δ. Adding this number to q3−δ−g+1, we have counted the elements
 in (12) with  ≤ q3 − δ twice. By using similar arguments as in the proof
of Proposition 5, the number of such elements equals
∑a+b
s=0(s+ 1)− a when
0 ≤ a < q, and it equals ∑a+bs=0(s + 1) when −q < a < 0. This proves the
proposition.
Proposition 8. Given 1 ≤ δ ≤ q the dimension of the code E˜(δ) satisfies
dim(E˜(δ)) ≥ q3 − bδ + δ ln(δ)c .
Proof. By Lemma 30 the elements λ ∈ H∗(Q) which do not satisfy σ(λ) ≥ δ
must belong to {iq+ j(q+ 1) | q2− δ ≤ i ≤ q2, q− δ ≤ j < q}. The number
of elements in this set having σ(λ) < δ is bounded above by bδ+ δ ln(δ)c by
Lemma 6. Since the total number of monomials in H∗(Q) is q3, the result
follows.
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4 Inclusion of improved codes
As already mentioned our first construction of improved nested code pairs
consists of choosing C˜(δ2) and E˜(δ1) such that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊂ E˜(δ1). To treat
this construction we therefore need a clear picture of the pairs (δ1, δ2) of
minimum distances that imply this inclusion. We establish this in the present
section. As it turns out, the formulas for σ and µ given in Proposition 3
mean that several cases must be considered, and each case is presented as
a separate proposition.
In the following, quantifiers on λ, ε are considered on the domain H∗(Q).
Given δ1 ∈ σ(H∗(Q)), define δmax2 to be the maximal value of δ2 such that
C˜(δ2)
⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) holds. This inclusion is equivalent to
∀λ : [(σ(λ) < δ1)→ (µ(λ) ≥ δ2)]. (13)
We first observe that if we can find a λ1 ∈ H∗(Q) such that[∀ε > λ1 : µ(ε) ≥ µ(λ1)] ∧ [∀ε < λ1 : σ(ε) ≥ δ1] (14)
is true, then (13) is also true whenever δ2 ≤ µ(λ1). In particular, we
therefore have
δmax2 ≥ µ(λ1). (15)
On the other hand, we immediately see from (13) that a λ2 ∈ H∗(Q) with
σ(λ2) < δ1 (16)
implies the bound
δmax2 ≤ µ(λ2). (17)
In the proofs of each of the following propositions, our strategy therefore
is to determine λ1 and λ2 satisfying (14) and (16), respectively, while also
satisfying µ(λ1) = µ(λ2). From (15) and (17) it then follows that δmax2 =
µ(λ1). Note, however, that λ1 and λ2 need not be distinct. If λ1 = λ2, we
shall simply use λ.
With this strategy in mind, the following lemmas will prove very useful.
Lemma 9. Let λ = iq + j(q + 1) ∈ H∗(Q), meaning that 0 ≤ i < q2 and
0 ≤ j < q. In addition, assume that i ≤ q2 − q, i = q2 − 1, or j = 0. If
ε ∈ H∗(Q) satisfies ε < λ, then σ(ε) ≥ σ(λ).
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Proof. For both the cases i < q2 − q and j = 0, the claim follows by
Lemma 26. If i = q2−q, Lemma 28 implies that σ(λ) = σ((i+j)q), and any
ε ∈ H∗(Q) satisfying λ > ε > (i+ j)q has σ(ε) ≥ σ((i+ j)q) by Lemma 29.
This also holds true for ε < (i+ j)q by the first part of the proof.
Finally, for i = q2−1 consider ε = i′q+ j′(q+ 1) ∈ H∗(Q) with ε < λ. If
q2−q ≤ i′ ≤ q2−1, the claim follows by Lemmas 27 and 29. Otherwise, ε is
at most (q2− q−1)q+ (q−1)(q+ 1) = q3− q−1, meaning that σ(ε) ≥ q+ 1
by Lemma 26. The proof follows by noting that σ(λ) ≤ q.
Lemma 10. Let λ = iq + j(q + 1) ∈ H∗(Q), meaning that 0 ≤ i < q2 and
0 ≤ j < q. In addition, assume that i ≥ q − 1 or j = 0. If ε ∈ H∗(Q)
satisfies ε > λ, then µ(ε) ≥ µ(λ).
Proof. This proof is similar to the one of Lemma 9. Defining the notation
λ′ = (q2 − 1 − i)q + (q − 1 − j)(q + 1), the translation of Lemma 25 into
information on µ gives µ(λ) = n− λ′ whenever
i > q − 1 or j = q − 1. (18)
Additionally, if ε ∈ H∗(Q) with ε > λ, then ε′ < λ′ where the ε′ is defined
in the same way as λ′. This implies that µ(λ) < µ(ε) when λ = iq+ j(q+ 1)
satisfies (18). This immediately proves the claim for i > q − 1.
For i = q − 1 the µ-equivalent of Lemma 28 gives µ(λ) = µ((i − (q −
1− j)) + (q− 1)(q + 1)), and any elements between have greater µ-value by
the translation of Lemma 29. The remaining elements greater than λ are
covered by the first part of the proof.
The last part of the proof is j = 0 and i < q− 1, which follows the same
procedure as the last part of the proof of Lemma 9.
Proposition 11. Let 2 ≤ δ1 ≤ q. Then C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) if and only if
δ2 ≤ q3 − (δ1 − 2)(q + 1).
Proof. Let λ′ = (q2 − 1)q + (q − δ1)(q + 1). We have σ(λ′) = δ1 by (8), and
Lemma 9 implies that σ(ε) ≥ δ1 for all ε < λ′. Additionally, Lemmas 27 and
29 yield that λ = λ′+ q+ 1 is the smallest element in H∗(Q) with a strictly
smaller σ-value. Combining this with Lemma 10 applied to λ reveals that
λ satisfies (14). However, (16) is satisfied as well since σ(λ) < δ1. Thus,
δmax2 = µ(λ) = q
3 − (δ1 − 2)(q + 1).
Proposition 12. Let q < δ1 ≤ q2 − q. Then C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) if and only if
δ2 ≤
{
q3 − q2 + q − δ1 + 2 if 0 ≤ b ≤ a
q3 − q2 − a(q + 1) if b > a
where δ1 − (q + 1) = aq + b for a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < q.
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Proof. First, observe that aq + b ≤ (q − 3)a+ (q − 1), meaning that a is at
most q − 3.
Assume that b = 0. Then λ = (q2 − 1− a)q has σ(λ) = δ1 − 1, meaning
that it satisfies (16). Note that µ(λ) = q3 − q2 − aq + 1, which can be
rewritten to obtain the claimed expression.
If 0 < b ≤ a, we can use λ = (q2−q−1−a+(b−1))q+(q−1−(b−1))(q+1),
which satisfies (16) since σ(λ) = δ1 − 1. Here, we see that
µ(λ) = q3 − q2 − aq − b+ 1 = q3 − q2 + q − δ1 + 2.
Finally, for b > a we can let λ = (q2 − q − 1)q + (q − 1 − a)(q + 1) with
σ(λ) = (a+ 1)q + a+ 1 < δ1. Again, λ satisfies (16). Calculating the value
of µ gives µ(λ) = q3 − q2 − a(q + 1).
In all three of the above situations, the element immediately preceding λ
in H∗(Q) is given by λ′ = λ− 1, and the reader may verify that σ(λ′) ≥ δ1.
In each case applying Lemma 9 to λ′ implies that σ(ε) ≥ δ1 for all ε < λ.
Lemma 10 applied to λ then shows that λ satisfies (14) as well. In conclusion,
the specified values of λ satisfy both (14) and (16), and computing each
value of µ(λ) gives the expression in the proposition.
Proposition 13. Let q2− q < δ1 ≤ q3− 2q2 + 2q. Then C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) if
and only if δ2 ≤ q3 − q2 + q + 2− δ1.
Proof. Set λ′ = n− δ1 and observe that λ′ ≥ 2q2 − 2q = 4g where g is the
genus of the Hermitian function field. Thus, λ′ is a non-gap in H∗(Q), and
σ(λ′) = δ1 by (8). Lemma 9 implies that any smaller element of H∗(Q) has
σ-value at least δ1. We see, however, that λ = λ′ + 1 has σ(λ) = δ1 − 1,
and it must be the smallest such value. At the same time it meets the
requirements of Lemma 10, implying that (14) is fulfilled. As already noted
λ satisfies (16) as well, meaning that δmax2 = µ(λ) = q3− q2 + q+ 2− δ1.
Proposition 14. Let q3 − 2q2 + 2q < δ1 ≤ q3 − q2. Then C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1)
if and only if
δ2 ≤

(a+ 1)q + b+ 2 if b < a
(a+ 2)q if a ≤ b < q − 1
(a+ 2)q + 1 if b = q − 1
where q3 − q2 − δ1 = aq + b for a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. First note that aq + b ≤ (q − 2)q, implying that a is at most q − 2.
Assume that b < a and let λ = (q+a−(b+1))q+(b+1)(q+1). This element
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satisfies the requirements of Lemma 10, and λ− 1 satisfies the requirements
of Lemma 9. This means that λ fulfils (14). Simultaneously, (16) is met
since σ(λ) = δ1 − 1. Thus, δmax2 = µ(λ) = (a+ 1)q + b+ 2.
Let a = b and λ = (q − 1)q + (a + 1)(q + 1). Applying Lemmas 9 and
10 to λ− 1 and λ as above, we see that λ satisfies (14). It also meets (16)
since σ(λ) = δ1 − 1. Subsequently, δmax2 = µ(λ) = (a+ 2)q.
Now, consider a < b < q − 1 and let λ1 = (q − 1)q + (a+ 1)(q + 1) and
λ2 = (a+ 1)q+ (q−1)(q+ 1). We can apply both Lemmas 9 and 10 to λ1 to
obtain that it satisfies (14). On the other hand, σ(λ2) < δ1 implies that (16)
is fulfilled. In addition, µ(λ1) = µ(λ2), which gives δmax2 = µ(λ1) = (a+ 2)q.
The remaining part is b = q−1. If this happens, note that λ = (q+a+1)q
has σ(λ) = δ1−1, whereas λ−1 = (a+1)q+(q−1)(q+1) has σ(λ−1) = δ1.
By the same arguments as in the first part of the proof, we obtain that
δmax2 = µ(λ) = (a+ 2)q + 1.
Proposition 15. Let q3 − q2 ≤ δ1 ≤ q3. Then C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) if and only
if
δ2 ≤
{
a+ 1 if b < a
a+ 2 if b ≥ a
where q3 − δ1 = aq + b for a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. Assume first that b < a, and set λ1 = aq and λ2 = a(q + 1). The
latter meets the assumptions of Lemmas 9 and 10, meaning that λ2 satisfies
(14). Observe that σ(λ1) < δ1 and µ(λ1) = µ(λ2). From this we see that
δmax2 = µ(λ1) = a+ 1.
Otherwise, if b ≥ a, let λ = (a + 1)q, which satisfies (16) by the obser-
vation that σ(λ) < δ1. The element of H∗(Q) immediately preceding λ is
λ′ = a(q + 1), which has σ(λ′) ≥ δ1. As in the previous proofs, applying
Lemmas 9 and 10 to λ′ and λ, respectively, shows that λ fulfils (14). Hence,
δmax2 = µ(λ) = a+ 2.
It is worth noting that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) if and only if every λ ∈ H∗(Q) with
σ(λ) < δ1 also satisfies µ(λ) ≥ δ2. By Proposition 3 this may be rewritten
as µ(λ) < δ1 implying σ(λ) ≥ δ2. Hence, the inclusion of codes is symmetric
in the sense that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) if and only if C˜(δ1)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ2).
One could expect that this symmetry would show up in Propositions
11–15 as well. However, this is not the case since the propositions describe
the maximal value of δ2 such that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) for a given value of δ1.
Although this implies that C˜(δ1)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ2), there may be a δ′ > δ1 such
that C˜(δ′)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ2) as shown in Example 1 below.
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Example 1. Let q = 4 and set δ1 = 6. Then considering the values of σ and
µ as given in Table 4 of the Appendix reveals that the greatest possible value
of δ2 such that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1) is given by δ2 = 48. By the observations
above we know that this implies C˜(6)⊥ ⊆ E˜(48) as well. However, inspecting
the tables again will reveal that the C˜(8)⊥ is also a subset of E˜(48). Notice
that both of these observations agree with the formulas in Propositions 12
and 14.
5 Improved nested codes of not too small codimension
Based on our findings in Sections 3 and 4, we are now able to describe
the parameters of our first construction of nested code pairs, namely the
one where the codimension is not too small. If δ1, δ2 ∈ H∗(Q) satisfy the
conditions in one of the Propositions 11–15, it follows that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1).
By the bounds (4) and (5) and the observation following Proposition 3, the
relative distance of this code pair is exactly d(E˜(δ1)) = δ1, and the relative
distance of its dual is d(C˜(δ2)⊥) = δ2.
For each possible pair of designed distances described in Propositions 11–
15, we can combine the dimensions of the usual Hermitian codes with
the dimension bounds of Propositions 7 and 8. This gives bounds on the
codimension, `, of C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1).
Proposition 16. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ H∗(Q), and δ1 ≤ q. Further, let δ2 satisfy the
conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1). Denote their
codimension by `.
If δ2 ≤ q, then
` ≥ q3 − bδ1 + δ1 ln(δ1)c − bδ2 + δ2 ln(δ2)c.
If q < δ2 ≤ q2 − q, then
` ≥ q3 + q2 − g + 1− bδ1 + δ1 ln(δ1)c − δ2 −
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1)
− bδ2 + δ2 ln
(
q2/δ2
)c+ max{a, 0}
where a and b are as in Proposition 7 applied to δ2.
If q2 − q < δ2 < q3 − 2g + 2, then
` ≥ q3 − g + 1− bδ1 + δ1 ln(δ1)c − δ2.
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Finally, if q3 − 2g + 2 ≤ δ2, we have
` ≥
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1)− bδ1 + δ1 ln(δ1)c −max{a, 0}
where q3 − δ2 = aq + b(q + 1) for −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. By Proposition 8 we have dim E˜(δ1) ≥ q3 − bδ1 + δ1 ln(δ1)c. In each
case, we can obtain a bound on the codimension ` by subtracting an upper
bound on C˜(δ2)⊥ = q3 − dim E˜(δ2). In turn, such a bound can be obtained
via a lower bound on dim E˜(δ2).
In the case δ2 ≤ q the dimension of E˜(δ2) can again be bounded by
Proposition 8. In the second case the bound on dim E˜(δ2) follows by Pro-
position 7. Proposition 5 delivers the bounds in the two final cases.
Proposition 17. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ H∗(Q) and q < δ1 ≤ q2 − q. Further, let
δ2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1).
Denote their codimension by ` and let a1, b1 be as in Proposition 7 applied
to δ1.
If δ2 ≤ q, then
` ≥ q3 + q2 − g + 1− δ1 −
a1+b1∑
s=0
(s+ 1) + max{a1, 0}
− bδ1 + δ1 ln(q2/δ1)c − bδ2 + δ2 ln(δ2)c.
If q < δ2 ≤ q2 − q, then
` ≥q3 + 2q2 − 2g + 2− (δ1 + δ2)−
a1+b1∑
s=0
(s+ 1) + max{a1, 0}
−
a2+b2∑
s=0
(s+ 1) + max{a2, 0} − bδ1 + δ1 ln(q2/δ1)c − bδ2 + δ2 ln(q2/δ2)c
where a2 and b2 are as in Proposition 7 applied to δ2.
Finally, if q2 − q < δ2, then
` ≥ q3 +q2−2g+2−(δ1 +δ2)−
a1+b1∑
s=0
(s+1)−bδ1 +δ1 ln(q2/δ1)c+max{a1, 0}.
Proof. We use the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition 16. A
bound for the dimension of E˜(δ1) can be found in Proposition 7. For
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δ2 ≤ q the bound on dim E˜(δ2) comes from Proposition 8, and in the
case q < δ2 ≤ q2 − q it comes from Proposition 7. In the final case the
bound follows from Proposition 5, where we note that δ2 ≤ q3 − 2g + 2 by
Proposition 12 and the assumption on δ1.
Proposition 18. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ H∗(Q) and q2−q < δ1 < q3−2g+2. Further,
let δ2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1).
Denote their codimension by `.
If δ2 ≤ q, we have
` ≥ q3 − g + 1− δ1 − bδ2 + δ2 ln(δ2)c.
If q < δ2 ≤ q2 − q, then
` ≥ q3 + q2− 2g+ 2− (δ1 + δ2)−
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1)−bδ2 + δ2 ln(q2/δ2)c+ max{a, 0}
where a and b are as in Proposition 7 applied to δ2.
Finally, for q2 − q < δ2 we have
` = q3 − δ1 − δ2 − 2g + 2.
Proof. Again, the the strategy is the same as in the proof of Proposition 16.
The exact dimension of E˜(δ1) is given by Proposition 5. For δ2 ≤ q the
dimension of E˜(δ2) can be bounded by applying Proposition 8, and in the
case q < δ2 ≤ q2 − q the bound follows by Proposition 7. For the final case
we note by Proposition 13 that δ2 < q3− q2 + q+ 2− (q2− q) = q3− 4g+ 2.
Hence, the exact dimension of E˜(δ2) is given by the first part of Proposition 5
in this case.
Proposition 19. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ H∗(Q) and q3 − 2g + 2 ≤ δ1. Further, let
δ2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C˜(δ2)⊥ ⊆ E˜(δ1).
Denote their codimension by `. Then
` ≥
a+b∑
s=0
(s+ 1)−max{a, 0} − bδ2 + δ2 ln(δ2)c
where q3 − δ1 = aq + b(q + 1) for −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. The dimension of E˜(δ1) is given by the last part of Proposition 5. To
obtain a bound on the maximal value of δ2, note that the the minimal value
of q3−δ1 can be written as q2−q−2 = q(q−2)+(q−2). Proposition 15 now
implies δ2 ≤ q. Hence, dim E˜(δ2) ≥ q3−bδ2+δ2 ln(δ2)c by Proposition 8.
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The application of Theorem 1 or 2 translates Propositions 16–19 into in-
formation on improved linear ramp secret sharing schemes and improved
asymmetric quantum codes, respectively. The details are left for the reader.
6 Improved information on nested codes of small codi-
mension
We will now consider a second construction which in general gives nested
code pairs of smaller codimension than the construction in Section 5. This
construction bears some resemblance to the one given in [7, Sec. IV], but
in the setting of Hermitian codes.
From the definition of the codes, CL(D,λ2Q) ( CL(D,λ1Q) whenever
λ2 < λ1 and both λ1 and λ2 belongs to H∗(Q). Our second construction is
captured by the following two propositions.
Proposition 20. Let λ1 = iq+j(q+1) ∈ H∗(Q) where i ≤ j < q, and define
λ2 = jq + i(q + 1)− 1. Then CL(D,λ2Q) ( CL(D,λ1Q) have codimension
` = j − i+ 1, and their relative distances satisfy
d
(
CL(D,λ1Q), CL(D,λ2Q)
)
= q3 − λ1 = d(CL(D,λ1Q)), (19)
and
d
(
CL(D,λ2Q)⊥, CL(D,λ1Q)⊥
)
= (i+ 1)(j + 1) ≥ d(CL(D,λ2Q)⊥). (20)
The inequality in (20) is strict if and only if i 6= 0 and j 6= q − 1.
Proof. The codimension of CL(D,λ1Q) and CL(D,λ2Q) is given by the
number of elements ε in H∗(Q) with λ2 < ε ≤ λ1. By (6) H∗(Q) contains
every integer between λ2 and λ1, meaning that the codimension is exactly
λ1 − λ2 = j − i+ 1.
To prove the first equalities in (19) and (20), we use Proposition 3 to
obtain σ(λ1) = q3 − λ1 and µ(λ2) = (i + 1)(j + 1). Applying (4) and (5)
then implies that the relative distances are at least q3−λ1 and (i+1)(j+1),
respectively. That these are indeed equalities follows from the observations
following Proposition 3.
In (19) the last equality follows from the last part of Proposition 3. For
(20) the observations in [8, Rem. 4] imply that (3) is in fact an equality.
Thus, the minimal distance of d
(
CL(D,λ2Q)⊥
)
is given by µ((i+j)(q+1)) =
i+ j + 1 if i+ j < q and
µ
(
(i− (q − 1− j))q + (q − 1)(q + 1)) = q(i+ j − q + 2)
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otherwise. In the first case equality with (i+ 1)(j + 1) occurs if and only if
i = 0, and in the second if and only if j = q − 1.
In the above construction we only consider values of i less than q. A similar
technique can be used for q2 − q ≤ i < q2. We state the proposition, but
omit the proof since it follows by similar arguments as above.
Proposition 21. Let λ1 = (q2− 1− i)q+ (q− 1− j)(q+ 1) ∈ H∗(Q) where
i ≤ j < q, and define λ2 = (q2 − 1 − j)q + (q − 1 − i)(q + 1) − 1. Then
CL(D,λ2Q) ( CL(D,λ1Q) have codimension ` = j−i+1, and their relative
distances satisfy
d
(
CL(D,λ1Q), CL(D,λ2Q)
)
= (i+ 1)(j + 1) ≥ d(CL(D,λ1Q)), (21)
and
d
(
CL(D,λ2Q)⊥, CL(D,λ1Q)⊥
)
= q3 − iq − j(q + 1) = d(CL(D,λ2Q)⊥).
The inequality in (21) is strict if i 6= 0 and j 6= q − 1.
By applying one of Theorems 1 and 2, we can transform Propositions 20
and 21 into information on improved linear ramp secret sharing schemes
and improved asymmetric quantum codes, respectively. The details of this
translation are left for the reader.
7 Comparison with bounds and existing constructions
Having presented two improved constructions of nested code pairs in Sec-
tions 5 and 6, this section is devoted to the comparison between the corre-
sponding asymmetric quantum codes and codes that already exist in the
literature. The codes are also compared with the Gilbert-Varshamov bound
for asymmetric quantum codes. Moreover, we compare the corresponding
secret sharing schemes with a recent lower bound on the threshold gap [3].
When presenting code parameters we give the actual codimension rather
than using the estimates in Section 5 which rely on the bounds in Proposi-
tions 7 and 8.
Since the codes obtained in Sections 5 and 6 are relatively long compared
to the field size, the literature does not contain many immediately compar-
able codes. Yet, one way to obtain such codes is by using Construction II
of La Guardia [17, Thm. 7.1], which gives asymmetric quantum generalized
Reed-Solomon codes. Adjusting the theorem to codes over Fq2 gives the
following result.
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Theorem 22. Let q be a prime power. There exist asymmetric quantum
generalized Reed-Solomon codes with parameters
[[m1m2,m1(2k −m2 + c),≥ d/ ≥ d− c]]q2
where 1 < k < m2 < 2k + c ≤ q2m1 and k = m2 − d + 1, and where
m2, d > c+ 1, c ≥ 1, and m1 ≥ 1 are integers.
Example 2. By using different values for the parameters in Theorem 22,
we obtain asymmetric quantum codes of varying lengths. If the chosen
parameters give a code of length less than q3, we can pad each codeword with
zeroes in order to obtain the correct length. Note that this does not change
the relative distance of the nested codes nor of their duals.
For q = 3 Table 1 lists the best code parameters that can be obtained
in this way together with the comparable codes from the constructions in
Sections 5 and 6. In the third column, the parameter dz is maximized under
the condition that the dimension and the distance dx are at least as high as
in [17]. In the fourth, the dimension is maximized, keeping at least the same
minimal distances. As is evident, the codes of the present paper perform
very favourably.
We further note that all presented new codes exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound for asymmetric quantum codes [18, Thm. 4]. Additionally, we remark
that nesting usual one-point Hermitian codes and using the Goppa bound
does not provide asymmetric quantum codes as good as the ones in columns
three and four.
The two constructions in Theorem 24 and Corollary 29 of [7] based on codes
defined from Cartesian product point sets provide another way to obtain
asymmetric quantum codes that can be compared to the ones in this paper.
We summarize these constructions in the following two theorems.
Theorem 23. Consider integers m ≥ 2 and s ≤ q where q is a prime
power. Given δ1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , sm} define v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} such that
sv ≤ δ ≤ sv+1, and choose an integer δ2 ≤ b(s − δ1/sv + 1)sm−v+1c. Then
there exists an asymmetric quantum code with parameters
[[sm, `, δ1/δ2]]q
where
` ≥ sm −
m∑
t=1
1
(t− 1)!
(
δ1
(
ln
(
sm
δ1
))t−1
+ δ2
(
ln
(
sm
δ2
))t−1)
.
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Theorem 24. Consider integers 1 < s ≤ q where q is a prime power, and
let m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s− 1}. Then for any ` ≤ m+ 1 such that ` is even if and
only if m is odd, there exists an asymmetric quantum code with parameters
[[s2, `, dz/dx]]q
where the distances are dz = 14
(
2s − (m − ` + 1))(2s − (m + ` − 1)) and
dx =
1
4
(m− `+ 3)(m+ `+ 1). The two distances may also be interchanged.
Construction of [17, Thm. 7.1] This paper
(m1,m2, k, c) Code dz maximized ` maximized
(2, 13, 2, 10) [[27, 2, 12/2]]9 [[27, 2, 23/2]]9 [[27, 12, 12/2]]9
(2, 13, 3, 8) [[27, 2, 11/3]]9 [[27, 2, 18/4]]9 [[27, 11, 11/3]]9
(2, 13, 4, 6) [[27, 2, 10/4]]9 [[27, 2, 18/4]]9 [[27, 10, 10/4]]9
(2, 13, 5, 4) [[27, 2, 9/5]]9 [[27, 2, 16/6]]9 [[27, 9, 9/6]]9
(2, 13, 6, 2) [[27, 2, 8/6]]9 [[27, 2, 16/6]]9 [[27, 10, 8/6]]9
(3, 9, 3, 4) [[27, 3, 7/3]]9 [[27, 3, 19/3]]9 [[27, 15, 7/3]]9
(3, 9, 4, 2) [[27, 3, 6/4]]9 [[27, 3, 17/4]]9 [[27, 15, 6/4]]9
(2, 13, 3, 9) [[27, 4, 11/2]]9 [[27, 4, 20/2]]9 [[27, 13, 11/2]]9
(2, 13, 4, 7) [[27, 4, 10/3]]9 [[27, 4, 18/3]]9 [[27, 12, 10/3]]9
(2, 13, 5, 5) [[27, 4, 9/4]]9 [[27, 4, 16/4]]9 [[27, 11, 9/4]]9
(2, 13, 6, 3) [[27, 4, 8/5]]9 [[27, 4, 14/6]]9 [[27, 10, 8/6]]9
(2, 13, 7, 1) [[27, 4, 7/6]]9 [[27, 4, 14/6]]9 [[27, 11, 7/6]]9
(2, 13, 4, 8) [[27, 6, 10/2]]9 [[27, 6, 18/2]]9 [[27, 14, 10/2]]9
(2, 13, 5, 6) [[27, 6, 9/3]]9 [[27, 6, 16/3]]9 [[27, 13, 9/3]]9
(2, 13, 6, 4) [[27, 6, 8/4]]9 [[27, 6, 14/4]]9 [[27, 12, 8/4]]9
(2, 13, 7, 2) [[27, 6, 7/5]]9 [[27, 6, 12/6]]9 [[27, 11, 7/6]]9
(2, 13, 5, 7) [[27, 8, 9/2]]9 [[27, 8, 16/2]]9 [[27, 15, 9/2]]9
(2, 13, 6, 5) [[27, 8, 8/3]]9 [[27, 8, 14/3]]9 [[27, 14, 8/3]]9
(2, 13, 7, 3) [[27, 8, 7/4]]9 [[27, 8, 12/4]]9 [[27, 13, 7/4]]9
(2, 13, 8, 1) [[27, 8, 6/5]]9 [[27, 8, 10/6]]9 [[27, 13, 6/6]]9
(2, 13, 6, 6) [[27, 10, 8/2]]9 [[27, 10, 14/2]]9 [[27, 16, 8/2]]9
(2, 13, 7, 4) [[27, 10, 7/3]]9 [[27, 10, 12/3]]9 [[27, 15, 7/3]]9
(2, 13, 8, 2) [[27, 10, 6/4]]9 [[27, 10, 10/4]]9 [[27, 15, 6/4]]9
(2, 13, 7, 5) [[27, 12, 7/2]]9 [[27, 12, 12/2]]9 [[27, 17, 7/2]]9
(2, 13, 8, 3) [[27, 12, 6/3]]9 [[27, 12, 10/3]]9 [[27, 17, 6/3]]9
(2, 13, 9, 1) [[27, 12, 5/4]]9 [[27, 12, 8/4]]9 [[27, 15, 6/4]]9
(2, 13, 8, 4) [[27, 14, 6/2]]9 [[27, 14, 10/2]]9 [[27, 19, 6/2]]9
(2, 13, 9, 2) [[27, 14, 5/3]]9 [[27, 14, 8/3]]9 [[27, 14, 8/3]]9
(2, 13, 9, 3) [[27, 16, 5/2]]9 [[27, 16, 8/2]]9 [[27, 19, 6/2]]9
(2, 13, 10, 1) [[27, 16, 4/3]]9 [[27, 17, 6/3]]9 [[27, 19, 4/3]]9
(2, 13, 10, 2) [[27, 18, 4/2]]9 [[27, 19, 6/2]]9 [[27, 21, 4/2]]9
(2, 13, 11, 1) [[27, 20, 3/2]]9 [[27, 21, 4/2]]9 [[27, 23, 3/2]]9
Table 1. Asymmetric quantum codes of length 27 over F9. The first column states the
parameters used in Theorem 22 to obtain the codes in the second. If necessary, these
have been padded with zeroes to obtain length 27. The codes in the third and fourth
columns are based on the construction in Sections 5 and 6.
Example 3. By using different parameters in Theorems 23 and 24 and
padding with zeroes if necessary, we obtain the asymmetric quantum codes
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presented in Table 2. This table also shows comparable codes from the
constructions in Sections 5 and 6 which have either dz or ` maximized as in
Example 2. From the table it is evident that the codes of the present paper
perform very favourably.
Again, we further note that all presented new codes exceed the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound [18, Thm. 4], and that these codes cannot be constructed
using information from the Goppa bound applied to nested one-point Hermi-
tian codes.
Example 4. A few codes of length 8 over F4 are given in [6]. The construc-
tion in Section 5 can match – but not improve on – the codes [[8, 1, 4/3]]4,
[[8, 2, 5/2]], [[8, 2, 3/3]]4, [[8, 3, 4/2]]4, and [[8, 4, 3/2]]4. Additionally, [6]
presents a code with parameters [[8, 1, 6/2]]4, where we can construct an
[[8, 1, 4/3]]4-code instead. All of these codes exceed the quantum Gilbert-
Varshamov bound [18, Thm. 4], and the Goppa bound applied to nested
one-point Hermitian codes cannot provide such parameters.
Some codes over F9 are presented as well. These codes do, however, have
a length that is at least 36.
When presenting constructions of codes, it is customary to compare it to
tables of ‘best known’ linear codes such as [20, 11]. Unfortunately, similar
tables do not exist for asymmetric quantum codes. As we shall recall in a
moment, however, one can still measure asymmetric quantum codes against
the usual bounds on linear codes.
Before doing so, we observe that the tables in [11] only contains alphabets
up to F9, whereas [20] has F256 as its largest alphabet. As indicated by the
following example, however, the latter tables are generally not as optimized
as the ones by [11].
Example 5. In some cases the improved codes E˜(δ) exceed the codes given
by [20]. For instance, when considering codes over F16, the codes E˜(12),
E˜(9), and E˜(8) with parameters [64, 48, 12]16, [64, 51, 9]16, and [64, 53, 8]16,
respectively, all provide a minimal distance that is one higher than the
corresponding code in the table.
Over F25 the same is true for the codes E˜(20), E˜(16), and E˜(12), which
have parameters [125, 97, 20]25, [125, 101, 16]25, and [125, 106, 12]25. Addi-
tionally, E˜(15) has parameters [125, 103, 15]25, exceeding the table distance
by 2.
Recall from Section 6 that our second construction of nested code pairs
(which are code pairs of small codimension) gives impure asymmetric quantum
codes. This is already an advantage as the error-correcting algorithms can
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take advantage of the impurity. Another advantage of considering relative
distances rather than only minimal distances emerges when analysing the
error-correcting ability of asymmetric quantum codes. In order to illustrate
this advantage, we can compare nested codes from the construction in Sec-
tion 6 with pairs of best known linear codes from the tables in [11, 20].
Note that the pairs of best known linear codes from such tables generally do
not result in nested code pairs; that is, they are not guaranteed to satisfy
the requirement that the dual of one code is contained in the other. The
comparison with tables of best known linear codes is done in the following
example. Whenever the tables of [20] are considered, we will use the min-
imum distance of an improved algebraic geometric Goppa code from the
Hermitian curve if this exceeds the table value as in Example 5.
Example 6. Having fixed a code pair C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ Fnq of codimension ` and
d(C1) = δ1, we consider the greatest value g(`, δ) such that the tables of best
known linear codes ensure the existence of C,C ′ ⊆ Fnq with dimC−dimC ′ =
`, d(C) = δ1, and d(C ′⊥) ≥ g(`, δ1). This is the same method as used in
[7], and bears resemblance to the idea in [6, Thm. 2]. Using this procedure
it is in no way guaranteed that C ′ ⊂ C. However, as shown in Table 3 the
construction in Section 6 is in many cases on par with the best known codes,
while simultaneously guaranteeing the inclusion C2 ⊂ C1. In some cases the
use of relative distances will even exceed the values obtained from the best
known codes. As in the previous examples, the codes in Table 3 all exceed
the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for asymmetric quantum codes [18, Thm. 4].
Turning to secret sharing schemes, [3] presents a lower bound on the
threshold gap r − t. That is, the authors bound the smallest possible
difference between the reconstruction number r and the privacy number t
for q-ary linear ramp secret sharing schemes with n shares and secrets from
from F`q. For linear ramp secret sharing schemes over Fq2 , they show that
r ≥ t+ (q
2m − 1)(n+ 2) + (q2m+2 − q2m)(`− 2m)
q2m+2 − 1 (22)
for every m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ` − 1}. Of course, one should choose the m that
gives the best bound. Comparing the secret sharing schemes obtained in this
paper with the bound (22) helps to quantify how optimal the construction is.
This is done in the following example, which also illustrates the advantage
of using the improved codes from Section 5 and the improved information
from Section 6 rather than relying solely on the Goppa bound applied to
nested one-point Hermitian codes.
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Constructions of [7] This paper
Type (s,m) Code dz maximized ` maximized
Thm. 24 (5, 2) [[27, 1, 16/4]]9 [[27, 1, 20/4]]9 [[27, 4, 16/4]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 4) [[27, 1, 9/9]]9 [[27, 1, 13/9]]9 [[27, 5, 9/9]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 1) [[27, 2, 20/2]]9 [[27, 2, 23/2]]9 [[27, 4, 20/2]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 3) [[27, 2, 12/6]]9 [[27, 2, 16/6]]9 [[27, 6, 12/6]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 2) [[27, 3, 15/3]]9 [[27, 3, 19/3]]9 [[27, 7, 15/3]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 4) [[27, 3, 8/8]]9 [[27, 3, 12/8]]9 [[27, 7, 8/8]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 3) [[27, 4, 10/4]]9 [[27, 4, 16/4]]9 [[27, 10, 10/4]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 5, 7/1]]9 [[27, 5, 19/2]]9 [[27, 17, 7/2]]9
Thm. 24 (5, 4) [[27, 5, 5/5]]9 [[27, 5, 13/6]]9 [[27, 13, 6/6]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 7, 6/1]]9 [[27, 7, 17/2]]9 [[27, 19, 6/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 7, 4/2]]9 [[27, 7, 17/2]]9 [[27, 21, 4/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 7, 3/3]]9 [[27, 7, 15/3]]9 [[27, 21, 3/3]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 8, 5/1]]9 [[27, 8, 16/2]]9 [[27, 19, 6/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 9, 3/2]]9 [[27, 9, 15/2]]9 [[27, 23, 3/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 10, 4/1]]9 [[27, 10, 14/2]]9 [[27, 21, 4/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 11, 2/2]]9 [[27, 11, 13/2]]9 [[27, 25, 2/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 12, 3/1]]9 [[27, 12, 12/2]]9 [[27, 23, 3/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 14, 2/1]]9 [[27, 14, 10/2]]9 [[27, 25, 2/2]]9
Thm. 23 (5, 2) [[27, 17, 1/1]]9 [[27, 17, 7/2]]9 [[27, 25, 2/2]]9
Table 2. Asymmetric quantum codes of length 27 over F9. The first column indicates
whether Theorem 23 or 24 was used in the codes given in the third column. The second
states the parameters used, except for those that can be read off directly from the code.
The codes in the fourth and fifth columns are based on the construction in Sections 5
and 6.
(i, j) Parameters g(`, δ1)
(2, 2) [[27, 1, 13/9]]9 9
(1, 1) [[27, 1, 20/4]]9 4
(1, 2) [[27, 2, 16/6]]9 6
(0, 1) [[27, 2, 23/2]]9 2
(0, 2) [[27, 3, 19/3]]9 3
(3, 3) [[64, 1, 37/16]]16 16
(2, 2) [[64, 1, 46/9]]16 8
(1, 1) [[64, 1, 55/ 4]]16 4
(2, 3) [[64, 2, 41/12]]16 12
∗
(1, 2) [[64, 2, 50/ 6]]16 6
(0, 1) [[64, 2, 59/ 2]]16 2
(1, 3) [[64, 3, 45/ 8]]16 8
∗
(0, 2) [[64, 3, 54/ 3]]16 3
(0, 3) [[64, 4, 49/ 4]]16 5
(i, j) Parameters g(`, δ1)
(4, 4) [[125, 1, 81/25]]25 25
(3, 3) [[125, 1, 92/16]]25 14
(2, 2) [[125, 1, 103/ 9]]25 –
(1, 1) [[125, 1, 114/ 4]]25 –
(3, 4) [[125, 2, 86/20]]25 19
(2, 3) [[125, 2, 97/12]]25 10
(1, 2) [[125, 2, 108/ 6]]25 –
(0, 1) [[125, 2, 119/ 2]]25 –
(2, 4) [[125, 3, 91/15]]25 13
(1, 3) [[125, 3, 102/ 8]]25 –
(0, 2) [[125, 3, 113/ 3]]25 –
(1, 4) [[125, 4, 96/10]]25 10
(0, 3) [[125, 4, 107/ 4]]25 –
(0, 4) [[125, 5, 101/ 5]]25 6
Table 3. Comparing the asymmetric quantum codes from Section 6 with the best known
codes. For q = 3 [11] is used, and for the remaining values of q, [20] is used. The codes
marked in bold exceed g(`, δ1), and the values of g(`, δ1) marked with an asterisk stem
from the improvements in Example 5. A dash indicates that the tables do not contain
enough information to determine g(`, δ1).
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0 2 4 6 8 10 12
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
`
r
Reconstruction number for q = 3, t ≥ 15
Goppa only
This paper
Lower bound
0 5 10 15 20
40
45
50
55
60
65
`
r
Reconstruction number for q = 4, t ≥ 40
Goppa only
This paper
Lower bound
0 10 20 30 40
90
100
110
120
`
r
Reconstruction number for q = 5, t ≥ 85
Goppa only
This paper
Lower bound
0 20 40 60 80
260
280
300
320
340
`
r
Reconstruction number for q = 7, t ≥ 260
Goppa only
This paper
Lower bound
Figure 1. The minimal achievable reconstruction number r given a desired privacy
number t. The plots show the constructions from Sections 5 and 6, a construction using
the Goppa bound only, and the lower bound from (22).
Example 7. In each of the plots in Figure 1, a desired privacy number t
has been fixed. For each codimension the plots then show the minimal
reconstruction number r achievable with the constructions from Sections 5
and 6 when privacy number at least t is required. The plots also show the
lower bound in (22).
Recall that the codes under consideration have length q3, meaning that
the four corresponding secret sharing schemes support 27, 64, 125, and 343
participants, respectively. As the plots demonstrate, the constructions of
this paper provide secret sharing schemes with parameters that could not be
obtained by using nested Hermitian one-point codes and the Goppa bound
alone.
We remark that the four given examples use a relatively large privacy
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parameter t. Yet, it is also possible to obtain improved reconstruction num-
bers for small values of t.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we presented two improved constructions of nested code pairs
from the Hermitian curve, and gave a detailed analysis of their performance
when applied to the concepts of secret sharing and asymmetric quantum
codes. Regarding information leakage in secret sharing we studied the recon-
struction number r and the privacy number t, which give information on full
recovery and full privacy, respectively. We note that it is possible to obtain
information about partial information leakage by studying relative general-
ized Hamming weights rather than just relative minimum distances [15, 9].
For asymmetric quantum codes we applied the CSS construction. Applying
the method of Steane’s enlargements [22] is a future research agenda.
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Appendix A Additional results on σ and µ
In this section we state a number of lemmas that are needed in Sections 3
and 4. The lemmas all follow as corollaries to Proposition 3. To aid the
reader in understanding them more easily, we first give an example for
reference.
Example 8. In Table 4 we list H∗(Q), σ(H∗(Q)), and µ(H∗(Q)) for the
Hermitian function field over F16, i.e. for q = 4. Entries are ordered
according to (i, j) where λ = iq + j(q + 1).
The first lemma explains when (2) equals the Goppa bound and when it is
sharper.
Lemma 25. For all λ = iq + j(q + 1) ∈ H∗(Q) it holds that σ(λ) ≥ n− λ
where n = q3. The inequality is strict if and only if q2 − q ≤ i < q2 and
1 ≤ j < q}.
The next five lemmas give information on the relation between the val-
ues σ(iq + j(q + 1)) and σ(i′q + j′(q + 1)) for different constellations of
i, j, i′, j′. Using the translation from σ to µ as given in Proposition 3, this
simultaneously implies relations on µ.
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15 19 23 27 31 35 39 43 47 51 55 59 63 67 71 75
10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62 66 70
5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60
49 45 41 37 33 29 25 21 17 13 9 5 4 3 2 1
54 50 46 42 38 34 30 26 22 18 14 10 8 6 4 2
59 55 51 47 43 39 35 31 27 23 19 15 12 9 6 3
64 60 56 52 48 44 40 36 32 28 24 20 16 12 8 4
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64
3 6 9 12 15 19 23 27 31 35 39 43 47 51 55 59
2 4 6 8 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54
1 2 3 4 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49
Table 4. Upper table: H∗(Q). Middle table: σ(H∗(Q)). Lower table: µ(H∗(Q))
Lemma 26. For 0 < i ≤ q2 − q − 1 and 0 ≤ j < q − 1 it holds that
σ(iq + j(q + 1)) = σ((i − 1)q + (j + 1)(q + 1)) + 1. Furthermore, for
0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − q − 1 it holds that σ(iq + (q − 1)(q + 1)) = σ((i+ q)q) + 1.
Lemma 27. The sequence(
σ(0·q), σ(q), . . . , σ((q2 − 1)q), σ((q2 − 1)q + (q + 1)),
σ((q2 − 1)q + 2(q + 1)), . . . , σ((q2 − 1)q + (q − 1)(q + 1)))
is strictly decreasing.
Lemma 28. We have σ((q2− q+s)q+ t(q+ 1)) = σ((q2− q+ t)q+s(q+ 1))
for 0 ≤ s, t < q − 1.
Lemma 29. Given q2 − q ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1 then for non-negative s such that
q2 − q ≤ i − s we have σ((i − s)q + s(q + 1)) ≥ σ(iq). Similarly, given
0 ≤ j ≤ q2 − 1 then for non-negative s such that j + s ≤ q − 1 we have
σ((q2 − 1− s)q + (j + s)(q + 1)) ≥ σ((q2 − 1)q + j(q + 1)).
Lemma 30. If σ(iq + j(q + 1)) ≤ q then q2 − q ≤ i < q2.
Finally, we present a lemma on the relation between σ(λ) and µ(λ) for λ
belonging to a certain window.
Lemma 31. For λ = iq + j(q + 1) ∈ H∗(Q) with q ≤ i < q2 − q and j
arbitrary; or q2 − q < i ≤ q2 − 1 and j = 0; or 0 ≤ i < q and j = q − 1, we
have µ(λ) + σ(λ) = q3 − (q2 − q − 1).
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